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Abstract 
Most studies of democratic developments are limited to the period after World War II. 
However, political regimes varied according to different aspects of democracy long before the 
establishment of modern liberal mass democracies. We come down strongly in favor of 
collecting disaggregate and fine-grained historical data on democratic features. Based on a 
distinction between competition, participation, and constraints, we discuss previous attempts at 
historical measurement and address the specific challenges that pertain to scoring political 
regimes in, first, the “long 19th century” and, second, medieval and early modern Europe. 
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Introduction 
Most of our inferences about comparative democratic development derive from a “biased 
sample”, namely the period after 1945 (Boix 2011; Capoccia and Ziblatt 2010). There is an 
increased recognition within political science that we can gain much from going further back in 
time when attempting to draw valid inferences about the causes and consequences of political 
institutions and regime types. This is reflected in several new data gathering projects that attempt 
to measure the characteristics of political institutions, leaders, and events back into the 19th 
century (e.g., Przeworski 2013; Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza 2009; Elkins, Ginsburg and 
Melton 2009).  
The much-discussed relationship between political institutions and economic development 
illustrates the potential gains from employing historical data. Economic historians have proposed 
that as recently as 1800, the major agrarian civilizations in North America, Latin America, 
Western Europe, and East Asia were on par regarding economic development (Bulmer-Thomas 
2014; Pomeranz 2000). Thenceforth they developed along dissimilar trajectories, and today their 
average levels of income and social development are worlds apart. Similarly, a reversal of 
fortunes occurred within Europe between the Middle Ages and the Industrial Revolution, as the 
North and the West overtook the South and the East in terms of economic development (De 
Long and Shleifer 1993). 
These differing developmental trajectories correlate with salient institutional changes, such 
as the abolishment of absolute monarchy and extensions of the franchise. More generally, it is 
difficult to see how such divergences could owe to differences in culture or natural endowments 
alone; prima facie the trajectories lend support to the importance of political institutions (e.g., 
Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; North and Weingast 1989). However, due to a dearth of 
historical data little is known empirically about which particular institutions matter the most for 
spurring economic development. Only by going historical can we obtain sufficient information 
to disentangle the causes and consequences of various institutions from each other, and from 
potential confounders, and thereby rigorously examine more exact institutional theories of 
development.  
These points have direct relevance for the measurement of democracy. Some scholars 
argue that it is meaningless to talk about the degree of democracy for countries that do not fulfill 
certain baseline criteria (see Collier and Adcock 1999). However, as Munck (2015) argues, 
democratic quality is basically a matter of democracy level, and it thus makes sense to measure 
democratic quality both for polities that have crossed the threshold of the category of, say, 
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polyarchy (Dahl 1971) and for those that have not. More particularly, we contend that political 
regimes varied in “democraticness” long before the advent of modern liberal mass democracies 
in the early 20th century (Doorenspleet 2000; Paxton 2000).  
However, going historical does pose challenges. First, as we venture back in time, 
information needed for measuring political institutions becomes scarcer. Second, we must 
identify aspects of historical institutional variation that often differs from contemporary 
institutional designs. Third, as most historians only cover singular cases and do not use a more 
general vocabulary to describe these case-specific developments, we need to translate this work 
into something that fits our predefined conceptual containers. Fourth, historians often have an 
explanatory agenda of their own, meaning that a critical reading of patterns in historiography is 
necessary (Lustick 1996). 
The upshot of this is that attention must be focused on core aspects of democracy that are 
both measurable based on narrative works of historians and meaningful to assign scores to prior 
to, say, equal and universal suffrage. Furthermore, we need to disaggregate such measures so that 
particular regime characteristics can be traced, irrespective of whether or not the more general 
whole – modern democracy – was present. 
Various suggestions for how to pin down the core attributes of the democracy concept 
exist. The seminal one is Dahl’s (1971) distinction between contestation and inclusiveness (see 
also Rokkan 1968). A number of scholars have added a third attribute termed “control” (Lauth 
2004), “consultation” (Mazucca 2010), “executive power” (Rokkan 1968), or “constraints on the 
executive” (North and Weingast 1989; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). We structure our 
discussion of the historical measurement of democracy around these three attributes, which we 
term Competition, Participation, and Constraints. We address shortcomings of existing indicators and 
discuss ways of coding additional features of competition, participation and constraints, first in 
the “long 19th century” between the French Revolution and World War I, and, second, in 
medieval and early modern Europe. 
 
 
 
 
 5 
The long 19th century 
Competition 
Elections of various kinds have a long history, and we find some early examples of alternation 
between proto-parties, for instance between the “Hats” and “Caps” during the Swedish Age of 
Liberty (1718-1772). But the long 19th century was the era in which regularized presidential and 
parliamentary elections turned so competitive that they prompted transitions of power from 
incumbents to the opposition across a wider range of countries. This happened in the United 
States following a deeply divisive election of 1800, and by the 1830s alternations occurred in 
Great Britain and parts of Latin America (Przeworski 2015). These developments are covered in 
Przeworski’s (2013) PIPE dataset, while Vanhanen (2000) uses the largest party’s seat share to 
measure competition from 1810. 
However, other institutional aspects of 19th century elections, not covered by extant 
datasets, affected the nature of the competition, for instance formal and informal restrictions on 
which candidates could run for office (e.g., according to income, property, education, race, or 
gender). Furthermore, incumbents frequently reduced the competitiveness of elections through 
subtle strategies like manipulating district boundaries, restricting media access, pressure in 
connection with open voting, using election violence, or manipulating vote counting (Goldstein 
1978; Posada-Carbó and Valenzuela forthcoming). For instance, 19th century US elections were 
often marred by voter fraud and election violence, and “Rotten Boroughs” existed in Britain 
until the Reform Act of 1832.  
Finally, overt and covert repression of freedoms of expression, association, and assembly 
are also crucial for the competitiveness of political systems. These more or less subtle 
competition-reducing tactics are harder to measure than government alternation with respect to 
reliability and cross-country equivalence. But based on historical material and knowledge, it 
would still be possible to code them.  
 
Participation 
The 19th century saw dramatic improvements in male franchise in many countries. Typically, the 
franchise was restricted based on criteria such as ethnicity, income, and property (Goldstein 
1978). In some countries, such as the UK, the franchise was expanded in a stepwise manner; in 
other countries, such as France, changes were more abrupt. 
This important indicator of participation is measurable for 19th century polities. 
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Nonetheless, PIPE is the only source with two comprehensive indicators of suffrage restrictions. 
One distinguishes between the following categories of franchise: none; estate; property only; 
three different combinations of property, income, taxes, educational titles, exercise of 
profession, and/or literacy; economically independents; and manhood suffrage. The other 
indicates whether other restrictions exist, based on ethnicity, territory, political observation, 
religion, military/police personnel, slaves, priests/nuns, or property owners.  
However, even these indicators only paint a rough picture of the empirical variation in the 
long 19th century as there were other formal and informal barriers to voter registration and 
voting. For example, election violence not only de facto limited competition, but also reduced the 
ability of many citizens to partake in elections despite de jure voting rights. Such restrictions are 
partly reflected in Vanhanen’s (2000) second democracy indicator, i.e., the percentage of the 
adult population that actually votes. However, this measure does not provide information about 
the particular restrictions, and it may also tap other things. 
One key aspect of many 19th century elections was their indirect nature, which affected 
whether all individuals participated on equal terms. Voters first designated electors, who then 
came together – often without clear restrictions or monitoring of which candidates to vote for – 
to select representatives, inducing highly unequal distribution of influence between regular voters 
and electors. One example is Norway, which maintained an indirect election system until 1905. 
Moreover, some systems applied weighting of votes, as exemplified by Prussia’s three-class 
franchise system from 1849-1918 in which voters were divided into three groups after taxes paid, 
giving disproportionate influence to wealthy citizens. Other examples include Belgium, the UK, 
and New Zealand, where plural voting was credited to privileged groups, and Sweden until 1866, 
where societal estate groups (noble, clerics, burghers, and farmers) voted for representatives in 
different chambers. These aspects, too, can be coded systematically based on historical sources, 
though informal limitations are difficult to score. 
 
Constraints 
A widely used cross-national measure, extending back to 1800, is Polity’s XCONST indicator, 
tapping “the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief 
executives” (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers 2014: 23). XCONST ranges from 1 (“Unlimited 
authority”) to 7 (“Executive Parity or Subordination”), meaning that other institutions, such as 
legislatures, parties, courts, or noble councils have equal or greater effective authority than the 
chief executive in most policy areas.  
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The political histories of many European countries in the long 19th century demonstrate 
the relevance of measuring this dimension as they can be interpreted as a battle between 
opposition groups, often strongly represented in parliament, and the executive (the monarch and 
his/her cabinet), with the former trying to obtain prerogatives in various policy areas and control 
over the latter (Congleton 2010). One example is Norway’s drawn-out 19th century fight over 
parliamentary control over the government, which was resolved in 1884 when the King was 
forced to appoint a new government led by the liberal opposition. In Latin America, fierce 
struggles – or the lack thereof – between different branches of government further illustrate the 
importance of indicators reflecting constraints. 
More generally, it is important to unpack the notions of parliaments; not only did their 
powers vary; their composition and structure also differed from case to case. Although 
XCONST captures some of these differences and developments, the diverse formal and 
informal institutional set-ups and trajectories in the long 19th century also reveal its limitations. 
We need more fine-grained institutional measures of the chief executive’s relationship to the 
legislature, the judiciary, and implementing institutional bodies, including election administration. 
This would also allow us to distinguish regimes where the executive is mainly constrained by 
institutions representing broader population groups from constraints induced by less 
representative institutions. 
 
Medieval and early modern Europe 
Scholars have traced features of competition, participation, and constraints all the way back to 
the Middle Ages (e.g., Downing 1992; Finer 1997; Mazucca 2010). Most of this work relates to 
medieval representative institutions. The reason for this is mainly that the workings and 
prerogatives of these institutions are among the best described features in a period with scarce 
historical data.  
 
Competition 
Medieval and early modern parliaments did not rule themselves, but legislated together with a 
monarch who exercised power (Myers 1975; Finer 1997). Although there was no genuine 
electoral competition for executive power, there was some competition for succession to the 
throne. Kokkonen and Sundell (2014) have coded succession orders in Europe between 1000-
1800 AD, distinguishing between (i) election/selection, (ii) agnatic seniority, and (iii) 
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primogeniture. There is obviously a qualitative difference in competition between the first and 
the two others. In some polities – e.g. Poland and Hungary – parliaments had the constitutional 
prerogative to elect monarchs whenever one died; in other polities the choice fell to parliament 
when a ruling line died out (Myers 1975; Stasavage 2010). 
More generally, succession crises were often settled by parliament, even for succession 
orders based on primogeniture (see O’Callaghan 1989). Thus, one could make more fine-grained 
empirical distinctions in degree of competition over succession for each of the three categories. 
Further, one could envisage coding other aspects of competitiveness, including the selection of 
representatives to parliaments and the designation of positions within parliament. This would be 
much more difficult to score empirically but some headway could surely be made using historical 
sources. 
 
Participation 
The scope of representation in medieval parliaments can be scored along two dimensions, 
namely the types of groups and the proportion of the population represented (see Myers 1975; 
Finer 1997). In some parliaments, only the high nobility and high clergy were represented. This 
was particularly common in the early phases of representative institutions. The usual pattern in 
Europe was thus one where the lower nobility and urban elites gained representation over time. 
The result was normally a parliament including nobles, clergy, and townsmen and divided into 
three different estates. But in some polities, including Denmark, Sweden, the marsh areas of 
Northwestern Germany, and Alpine areas of Austria and Switzerland, the free peasantry also 
sent representatives (Myers 1975). 
So far, extant datasets have not covered these distinctions, although they are relatively easy 
to code using historical sources and reveal interesting spatial differences and temporal 
developments. For instance, the English knights of shires (lower nobility) and burgesses (urban 
elites) were first present in parliament in the mid-13th century, but were only regularly 
represented after 1300 (Maddicott 2010). In Castile, urban representation became more 
restricted over time (O’Callaghan 1989; Myers 1975). In Denmark, the free peasantry lost the 
right to representation in 1600, well before parliament was abolished in 1660. The population 
share represented in assemblies also differed starkly. In Poland-Lithuania and the Republic of 
Venice, an estimated 8-12 percent of the population belonged to represented groups (nobles or 
citizens) compared to 2-3 percent in England and France (Finer 1997: 1047). It should be 
possible to score such differences in general degree of representation in accrued fashion. 
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Constraints 
Constraints on the executive varied a lot between European regimes before 1789. A crude 
distinction has been made between absolutist and constitutionalist monarchies (e.g., Downing 
1992; Ertman 1997). Recently, more fine-grained measures of parliamentary constraints on rulers 
have been collected. Stasavage (2010), van Zanden et al. (2012), and Abramson and Boix (2014) 
code the frequency with which parliaments were convoked across Europe from the 12th century 
onwards, and Stasavage (2010) has also coded other attributes of parliaments, including rights to 
veto taxation and audit expenditure. Most of these indicators relate to aggregate units. This is 
problematic because medieval political units were “composite states”, which included a number 
of constituent units each with their representative institutions. Likewise, units have typically been 
scored across relatively wide time periods. However, both the constituent units and shorter time 
spans are increasingly being covered by data collection efforts (see Abramson and Boix 2014). 
The larger problem is that numerous relevant aspects of parliamentary prerogatives have 
been ignored. With respect to constraints, the most fundamental distinction concerns whether 
parliament was a permanent assembly the ruler had to convoke at regular intervals (say, annually 
or biannually) or whether it was simply called at the ruler’s whim. This is not scored in any of the 
above-mentioned datasets. Furthermore, there were big differences in veto powers. In some 
parliaments, such as in Poland and Aragon, each representative had a veto (in Poland the 
notorious liberum veto), meaning that complete unanimity was required for decision making. In 
others, some kind of majoritarian decision making seems to have prevailed. 
Regarding more specific prerogatives, some assemblies were only consulted over taxation, 
others won the right to be consulted in all matters of royal government − in Aragon and 
Catalonia, for example, including declaration of war. In many places, changes in military service 
or appointments of royal officials likewise needed consent in parliament (e.g., Maddicott 2010: 
180). Historians have also documented the existence of freedom of speech of representatives in 
many medieval parliaments. 
Yet other aspects of constraints could be mapped. In Catalonia after 1359, the so-called 
Generalidad, a permanent committee of the corts, both collected and administrated taxes (Kagay 
1981: 212-43). Similarly, some monarchs recognized the right to resistance if privileges such as 
exemptions from taxation or right to self-government were transgressed (e.g., O’Callaghan 1989: 
86). While it would be difficult to ensure high reliability, and many political units would have 
missing data, many such prerogatives could be coded based on qualitative distinctions. 
 10 
Conclusions 
The first country to introduce equal and universal suffrage for men and women was New 
Zealand in 1893. However, there was large empirical variation in degrees of competition, 
participation and constraints long before this, indeed, even before the French Revolution. 
Historical work and some cross-country coding efforts – particularly for the 19th century – 
detail this variation, making it possible to distinguish historical regimes according to the degree 
of democracy or democratic quality. The omens here are promising as several ongoing data 
gathering projects are likely to shed further light on many of these features. For instance, 
Historical V-Dem, an offspring of the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project (www.v-
dem.net), is currently gathering data on numerous disaggregated indicators back to 1800 
(Knutsen et al. 2014; Teorell et al. 2014). These data will contain both objective indicators of 
formal-institutional features, and country-expert evaluations of the existence and functioning of 
formal and informal institutions relevant for measuring competition, participation, and 
constraints. 
So far, scholars have only scratched the surface with respect to coding aspects of medieval 
and early modern representative institutions in Europe. Numerous additional aspects pertaining 
to competition, participation and constraints could be coded based on historians’ narrative work, 
notably on medieval and early modern parliaments. New data on political regimes in and before 
the long 19th century would enable us to better address various empirical relationships, including 
those between political institutions and economic development. 
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